We present a computational analysis of basic Kerberos with and without its public-key extension PKI-NIT in which we consider authentication and key secrecy properties. Our proofs rely on the Dolev-Yao style model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met. This work was the first verification at the computational level of such a complex fragment of an industrial protocol. By considering a recently fixed version of PKINIT, we extend symbolic 
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols have traditionally been verified in one of two ways: the first, known as the Dolev-Yao or symbolic approach, abstracts cryptographic concepts into an algebra of symbolic messages [37] ; the second, known as the computational or cryptographic approach, retains the concrete view of messages as bitstrings and cryptographic operations as algorithms on bitstrings, while drawing security definitions from complexity theory [16, 39, 40] . While proofs in the computational approach (with its much more comprehensive adversary model) entail stronger security guarantees, conducting such proofs by hand is tedious and error-prone even for simple protocols and impractical for larger protocols. A first approach in mechanizing proofs in this model has so far only been tested on one commercial protocol [19] . On the other hand, verification methods based on the Dolev-Yao abstraction have become efficient and robust enough to tackle a wide range of large commercial protocols, often even automatically [1, 14, 15, 21, 22, 48] .
Kerberos, a widely deployed protocol that allows a user to authenticate herself to multiple end servers based on a single login, constitutes one of the most important examples that have been formally analyzed within the DolevYao approach so far. Kerberos 4, the then prevalent version, was verified using the Isabelle theorem prover [14, 15] . The currently predominant version, Kerberos 5 [54] , has been extensively analyzed using the Dolev-Yao approach. This analysis of Kerberos 5 showed: (a) the core protocol enjoys the expected authentication and secrecy properties except for some relatively innocuous anomalies [21] ; (b) "cross-realm" authentication in Kerberos is correct when compared against its specification but has weaknesses in practice [30] ; and (c) the then-current specification of the public-key extension (PKINIT) of Kerberos was susceptible to a serious attack [27] [28] [29] . The discovery of the attack on PKINIT led to an immediate correction of the specification and a security bulletin and patch for Microsoft Windows [50] .
The earlier security proofs for both Kerberos 5 and the fixes to PKINIT were carried out in the Dolev-Yao approach. Thus, despite the extensive research dedicated to the Kerberos protocol, and despite its tremendous importance in practice, at the time of our preliminary report on this work [5] , it remained an open question whether an actual implementation of Kerberos based on provably secure cryptographic primitives is secure under cryptographic security definitions with its much more comprehensive adversary. We closed this gap (at least partially) in the preliminary version of this paper [5] by providing the first security proofs of the core aspects of the Kerberos protocol in the computational approach. More precisely, we showed in the preliminary version of this paper [5] that core parts of Kerberos 5 are secure against arbitrary active attacks if the Dolev-Yaobased abstraction of the employed cryptography is implemented with actual cryptographic primitives that satisfy the commonly accepted security notions under active attacks, e.g., IND-CCA2 for public-key encryption.
Obviously, establishing proofs in the computational approach presupposes dealing with cryptographic details such as computational restrictions and error probabilities, hence one naturally assumes that our proofs heavily rely on complexity theory. However, our proofs are not performed from scratch in the cryptographic setting but based on the Dolev-Yao style framework of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [8, 11, 12] (called the BPW model henceforth), which provides computationally faithful symbolic abstractions of cryptographic primitives. The symbolically proved security properties also hold computationally when the symbolic abstractions are implemented with actual (secure) cryptographic operations. Thus our proofs themselves are symbolic in nature, but refer to primitives from the BPW model. Kerberos is the largest and most complex protocol whose cryptographic security has so far been inferred from proofs in this approach. Earlier proofs in this approach were conducted mainly for small examples of primarily academic interest [4, 7, 10] ; some similar work had been done on industrial protocols, e.g., by He and Mitchell [42] , although none that were as complex as Kerberos. (In Sect. 1.1, we note other analyses of industrial protocols that appeared after the preliminary report on this work [5] .) We furthermore analyze the recently fixed version of PKINIT and derive computational guarantees for it from a symbolic proof based on the BPW model. Finally, we also draw some lessons learned in the process, which highlight areas where to focus research in order to simplify the verification of large commercial protocols with computational security guarantees. In particular, it would be desirable to devise suitable proof techniques, based on the BPW model, for splitting large protocols into smaller pieces that can then be analyzed modularly while still retaining the strong link between the Dolev-Yao and the computational approaches. We view this as a research opportunity for the short-term future.
This paper extends work that has previously appeared in abbreviated form [5] . Differently from that presentation, here we present the full set of algorithms formalizing Kerberos and PKINIT as well as more complete proofs of our results. We have also changed our formalization of certificates binding keys to principals. Essentially, we now represent certificates using data structures that have previously been studied in the BPW model instead of defining new structures, which would require separate analysis of those structures.
Related work
Early work on linking Dolev-Yao models and cryptography [2, 3, 41, 46] only considered passive attacks and therefore cannot make general statements about protocols. A cryptographic justification for a Dolev-Yao model in the sense of simulatability [55] , i.e., under active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding interactive protocols, was first given by Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner in [11] with extensions in [8, 12] . Based on that Dolev-Yao model, the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe, Otway-Rees, and Yahalom protocols were proved secure in [4, 7, 10] . All these protocols are considerably simpler than Kerberos, which we analyze in this paper, and arguably of much more limited practical interest. Some work has been done on industrial protocols, such as 802.11i [42] , although Kerberos is still a much more complex protocol.
Laud [47] has presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric encryption under active attacks. His work is directly connected with a formal proof tool, but it is specific to certain confidentiality properties and protocol classes. Herzog et al. [43] and Micciancio and Warinschi [49] have also given a cryptographic underpinning under active attacks. They consider slightly simpler real implementations than in [11] , but their results are specific for public-key encryption and certain protocol classes and are thus narrower than those in [11] . Cortier and Warinschi [33] have shown that symbolically secret nonces are also computationally secret, i.e., indistinguishable from a fresh random value given the view of a cryptographic adversary. Backes and Pfitzmann [9] have established new symbolic criterion for proving a key cryptographically secret. Canetti and Herzog [26] have presented symbolic criterions for proving cryptographic secrecy and authentication in a Dolev-Yao model for public-key encryption that is more restricted but slightly simpler than the symbolic BPW model. The simulatibility soundness of their work relies on [24] and has recently been extended to include Diffie-Hellman key exchange in [25] . The restrictions imposed on the symbolic model makes this model immediately accessible to existing proof tools.
Unfortunately, none of the work above is comprehensive enough to provide computational security guarantees for Kerberos based on an existing symbolic proof; the work is missing suitable cryptographic primitives or it relies on slightly changed symbolic abstractions, e.g., as in [11] .
Sprenger et al. [58, 59] explored the mechanization of BPW proofs using the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. Via a series of sound abstractions, they obtain their abstract protocol model for role-based protocols that does not rely on handles as pointers to message terms. The efficiency is comparable to one of [47] but, again, their model is restricted to protocols that only use public-key encryption and no other cryptographic primitives. Therefore, neither the tool nor the abstract protocol model can be used to analyze Kerberos mechanically or to achieve simpler proofs.
Subsequent to the first version of this work [5] , various additional related work has appeared in the literature. Boldyreva and Kumar showed in [20] that the encryption algorithm of the simplified profile of basic Kerberos satisfies the cryptographic assumptions made in [5] for symmetric encryption. They also showed that the general profile encryption of basic Kerberos is weak and proposed a corrected version of the general profile encryption that satisfies these properties. Roy et al. [56] also proved computational security of Kerberos. In [57] , Roy et al. proved computational security of the PKINIT operation mode ("DH mode") that we do not consider here, as well as security of IKEv2. As another example of cryptographic proofs of security of an industrial-scale protocol, Gajek et al. [38] proved security properties of TLS.
In work with Blanchet [18, 19] , the last three authors of this paper used the CryptoVerif tool [17] to mechanically prove security properties of Kerberos in the computational model. CryptoVerif relies on a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus [52] . There is also other work on formulating syntactic calculi for dealing with probability and polynomial-time considerations and encoding them into proof tools, in particular [34, 45, 51] . This is orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models, which offer a higher level of abstractions and thus much simpler proofs where applicable, so that proofs of larger systems can be automated.
Structure of the paper
We start in Sect. 2 with a review of Kerberos and its public-key extension PKINIT. In Sect. 3, we recall the BPW model (e.g., [6, 8, 12, 13] ) and apply it to the specification of Kerberos 5 and public-key Kerberos (i.e., Kerberos with PKINIT). In Sect. 4, we prove security results for these protocols and lifts them to the computational level. Finally, Sect. 5 summarizes this effort and outlines areas of future work.
Kerberos 5 and its public-key extension
The Kerberos protocol [53, 54] allows a legitimate user to log on to her terminal once a day (typically) and then transparently access all the networked resources she needs for the rest of that day in her organization. Each time she wants to, e.g., retrieve a file from a remote server, a Kerberos client running on her behalf securely handles the required authentication. The client acts behind the scenes, without any user intervention.
The main Kerberos protocol comprises three exchanges: the initial round of authentication, in which the client obtains log-in credentials that might be good for a full day; the second round of authentication, in which she presents her first credentials in order to obtain a short-term credentials (fiveminute lifetime) to use a particular network service; and the client's interaction with the network service, in which she presents her short-term credentials in order to negotiate access to the service.
In the core specification of Kerberos 5 [54] , all three exchanges solely use symmetric (shared key) cryptography. Since the initial specification of Kerberos 5, the protocol has been extended by the definition of an alternate first round that uses asymmetric (public-key) cryptography. This alternative exchange, that is called PKINIT, may be used in two modes: "public-key encryption mode" and "Diffie-Hellman (DH) mode." In recent work [27] [28] [29] , we showed that there was an attack against the then-current draft specification of PKINIT when the public-key encryption mode was used and then symbolically proved the security of the specification as it was revised in response to our attack. Here we study both basic Kerberos (without PKINIT) and the public-key mode of PKINIT as it was revised to prevent our attack. The fix first appeared in revision 27 of the PKINIT specification [44] ; subsequent drafts have not changed this aspect of PKINIT. The fix is also present in the current version of PKINIT [61] , which is now a RFC within the IETF [60] standards process. In the rest of this section, we describe the operation of both basic Kerberos and Kerberos with PKINIT in public-key mode.
Kerberos basics
The client process-usually acting for a human user-interacts with three additional types of principals when using Kerberos 5 (with or without PKINIT). The client's goal is to be able to authenticate herself to various application servers (e.g., email, file, and print servers). This is done by obtaining a "ticket-granting ticket" (TGT) from a "Kerberos Authentication Server" (KAS) and then presenting this to a "Ticket-Granting Server" (TGS) in order to obtain a "service ticket" (ST), the credentials that the client uses to authenticate herself to the application server. A TGT might be valid for a day, and may be used to obtain several STs for many different application servers from the TGS, while a single ST is valid for a few minutes (although it may be used repeatedly) and is used for a single application server. The KAS and the TGS are together known as the "Key Distribution Center" (KDC).
The client's interactions with the KAS, TGS, and different application servers are called the Authentication Service (AS), Ticket-Granting (TG), and Client-Server (CS) exchanges, respectively. We will describe the AS exchange separately for basic and public-key Kerberos; as PKINIT does not modify the other exchanges, we only need to describe them once.
The traditional AS exchange The abstract structure of the AS exchange is given in Fig. 1 . A client C generates a fresh nonce n 1 and sends it, together with her own name and the name T of the TGS for whom she desires a TGT, to the KAS K . This message is called the AS_REQ message [54] . The KAS responds by generating a fresh authentication key AK for use between the client and the TGS and sending an AS_REP message to the client. Within this message, AK is sent back to the client in the encrypted message component {AK , n 1 , t K , T } k C ; this also contains the nonce n 1 from the AS_REQ, the KAS's local time t K , and the name of the TGS for whom the TGT was generated. (The AK and t K to the right of the figure illustrate that these values are new between the two messages.) This component is encrypted under a long-term key k C shared between C and the KAS; this key is usually derived from the user's password. This is the only time that k C is used in a standard Kerberos run because later exchanges use freshly generated keys. AK is also included in the ticket-granting ticket TGT sent alongside the message encrypted for the client. The TGT consists of AK , C, t K , where t K is K 's local time, encrypted under a long-term key k T shared between the KAS and the TGS named in the request. The computational model we use here does not support timestamps, so we will treat these as nonces; as shown in [31] , this does not alter the authentication and confidentiality properties of a protocol such as Kerberos. These encrypted messages are accompanied by the client's name-and other data that we abstract away-sent in the clear. Once the client has received this reply, she may undertake the Ticket-Granting exchange.
It should be noted that the actual AS exchange, as well as the other exchanges in Kerberos, is more complex than the abstract view given here. In particular, we do not model Kerberos' options or flags, which range over a limited number of valid numbers that are publicly known. Neither do we model error messages or most checksums. We refer the reader to [54] for the complete specification of Kerberos 5, [61] for the specification of PKINIT, and [21] for a formalization of Kerberos at an intermediate level of detail.
The AS exchange with PKINIT PKINIT [61] is an extension to Kerberos 5 that uses public-key cryptography to avoid shared secrets between a client and KAS; it modifies the AS exchange but not other parts of the basic Kerberos 5 protocol. The long-term shared key (k C ) in the traditional AS exchange is typically derived from a password, which limits the strength of the authentication to the user's ability to choose and remember good passwords; PKINIT does not use k C and thus avoids this problem. Furthermore, if a public-key infrastructure (PKI) is already in place, PKINIT allows network administrators to use it rather than expending additional effort to manage users' long-term keys as in traditional Kerberos. This protocol extension adds complexity to Kerberos as it retains symmetric encryption in the later rounds but relies on asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, and corresponding certificates in the first round.
In PKINIT, the client C and the KAS each possess public/ private key pairs, ( pk C , sk C ) and ( pk K , sk K ), respectively. Certificate sets Cert C and Cert K issued by a PKI independent from Kerberos are used to testify of the binding between each principal and her purported public key. This simplifies administration as authentication decisions can now be made based on the trust the KDC holds in just a few known certification authorities within the PKI, rather than keys individually shared with each client (local policies can, however, still be installed for user-by-user authentication). Dictionary attacks are defeated as user-chosen passwords are replaced with automatically generated asymmetric keys. 1 As noted above, PKINIT can operate in two modes. These resemble the basic AS exchange in that the KAS generates a fresh key AK for the client and TGS to use, and then the KAS transmits AK and the TGT to the client. The modes of PKINIT provide two different ways for the KAS to transmit this key using the asymmetric key pairs rather than a key that is shared between the client and KAS. In DH mode, the key pairs ( pk C , sk C ) and ( pk K , sk K ) are used to provide digital signature support for an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement that produces a key which is then used to protect the fresh key AK . A variant of this mode allows the reuse of previously generated shared secrets. In public-key encryption mode, analyzed here, the key pairs are used for both signature and encryption. The latter is designed to (indirectly) protect the confidentiality of AK , while the former ensures its integrity.
We will not discuss the DH mode any further; the only support we are aware of for this mode is in the PacketCable system [23] , developed by CableLabs, a cable television research consortium. As noted above, DH mode has been analyzed by Roy et al. [57] . Figure 2 illustrates the AS exchange when the fixed version (which defends against the attack of [27] [28] [29] ) of PKINIT is used. Here, we use [m] sk for the digital signature of message m with secret key sk, {{m}} pk for the encryption of m with the public key pk, and {m} k for the encryption of m with the symmetric key k.
The first line of Fig. 2 shows our formalization of the AS_REQ message that a client C sends to a KAS K when using PKINIT. The last part of the message-C, T, n 1 -is the message in the traditional AS_REQ message. The new data that are added by PKINIT consist of the client's certificates Cert C and her signature (with her secret key sk C ) over a timestamp t C and another nonce n 2 . (The nonces and timestamp at the left of this line indicate that these are generated by C specifically for this request.)
The second line in Fig. 2 shows our formalization of K 's response, which is more complex than in basic Kerberos. The last part of the message-C, T GT, {AK , n 1 , t K , T } kis very similar to K 's reply in basic Kerberos; the difference is that the symmetric key k (which takes the place of k C in basic Kerberos) protecting AK is now freshly generated by K and is not a long-term shared key. Because k is freshly generated for the reply, it must be communicated to C before she can learn AK . PKINIT does this by adding the message {{Cert K , [k, ck] sk K }} pk C . This contains K 's certificates and his signature, using his secret key sk K , over k and a keyed hash ck ("checksum" in the language of [54] ) taken over the entire request AS_REQ from C using the key k; all of this is encrypted under C's public key pk C . The keyed hash ck binds this response to the client's request and was added in response to the attack we discovered and reported in [27] [28] [29] .
The later exchanges After the client C has obtained the key AK and the TGT, either through the basic AS exchange or the PKINIT AS exchange, she then initiates the TGS exchange. This exchange is shown in Fig. 3 . The first line of this figure shows our formalization of the client's request, called a TGS_REQ message; it contains the TGT (which is opaque to the client), an authenticator {C, t C } AK , the name of the server S for which C desires a service ticket and a nonce n 3 . Once the TGS receives this message, he decrypts the TGT to learn AK and uses this to decrypt the authenticator. Assuming his local policies for granting a service ticket are satisfied (while we do not model these here, they might include checks such as whether the request is sufficiently fresh), the TGS produces a fresh key SK for C and S to share and sends this back to the client in a TGS_REP message. The form of this message is essentially the same as the basic AS_REP message from the KAS to C: it contains a ticket (now the service ticket, or ST, {SK, C, t T } k S instead of the TGT) encrypted for the next server (now S instead of T ) and encrypted data for C (now encrypted under AK instead of k C or k).
Finally, after using the AS exchange to obtain the key SK and the ST, the client may use the CS exchange to authenticate herself to the end server. Figure 4 shows this exchange, including the optional reply from the server that authenticates this server to the client. As shown in the first line of the figure, C starts by sending a message (AP_REQ) that is similar to the TGS_REQ message of the previous round: it contains the (service) ticket and an authenticator ({C, t C } SK ) Attack on PKINIT The attack we found against the thencurrent specification of PKINIT was reported in [27] [28] [29] . This attack was possible because, at the time, the reply from the KAS to the client contained
In particular, the KAS did not sign any data that depended upon the client's name. This allowed an attacker who was herself a legitimate client to intercept a message from another client C to the KAS, use this data in her own request to the KAS, read the reply from the KAS, and then send this reply to C as though it was generated by the KAS for C (instead of for the attacker). The effect of this attack was that the attacker could gain knowledge of all new keys shared between the client and various servers. It could do so either by translating messages as in the AS exchange (collecting keys along the way) or by impersonating these servers (and creating the keys in the first place). In the former variation, the client would be authenticated as the attacker and not as C.
Security properties
We now summarize the security properties that we prove here at the symbolic level for both basic Kerberos and Kerberos with PKINIT; the implications on the computational level are discussed in the subsequent sections. We have proved similar properties in symbolic terms using a formalization in MSR for basic Kerberos [21, 22] and for the AS exchange when PKINIT is used [27] [28] [29] . Our subsequent work with CryptoVerif has given mechanized proofs of similar properties in the computational model [18, 19] . The first property we prove here concerns the secrecy of exchanged keys, a notion that is captured formally as Definition 1 in Sect. 4. This property may be summarized as follows:
Property 1 (Key secrecy) For any honest client C and honest server S, if the TGS T generates a symmetric key SK for C and S to use (in the CS exchange), then the intruder does not learn the key SK .
The second property we study here concerns entity authentication, formalized as Definition 2 in Sect. 4. This property may be summarized as follows:
Property 2 (Authentication properties)
i. If a server S completes a run of Kerberos, apparently with C, then earlier: (a) C started the protocol with some KAS to get a ticket-granting ticket; and (b) then requested a service ticket from some TGS. ii. If a client C completes a run of Kerberos, apparently with server S, then S sent a valid AP_REP message to C.
Theorem 1 below shows that these properties hold for our symbolic formalizations of basic and public-key Kerberos in the BPW model; Theorem 2 shows that the authentication property holds as well for cryptographic implementations of these protocols if provably secure primitives are used; the standard cryptographic definition of key secrecy, however, turns out not to hold for cryptographic implementations of Kerberos. We will return to this point below. Because authentication can be shown to hold for Kerberos with PKINIT, it follows that at the level of cryptographic implementation, the fixed specification of PKINIT does indeed defend against the attack reported in [27] [28] [29] .
The BPW model
We will now abstractly review the BPW model and then formalize Kerberos using it.
Review of the BPW model
The BPW model introduced in [13] offers a deterministic Dolev-Yao style formalism of cryptographic protocols with commands for a vast range of cryptographic operations such as public-key and symmetric key encryption/decryption, generation, and verification of digital signatures as well as message authentication codes, and nonce generation as well as the inclusion of payloads (application data). Every protocol participant is assigned a machine (an I/O automaton), which is connected to the machines of other protocol participants and which executes the protocol for its user by interacting with the other machines (see Fig. 5 ). In this reactive scenario, semantics is based on state, i.e., on who already knows which terms. The state is here represented by an abstract "database" and handles to its entries: Each entry (denoted D[ j]) of the database has a type (e.g., "signature") and pointers to its arguments (e.g., "private key" and "message"). This corresponds to the way Dolev-Yao terms are represented. Furthermore, each entry in the abstract database also comes with handles to participants who have access to that entry. . For instance, if the BPW model receives a command, e.g., from a user machine, to encrypt a message m with key k, then it makes a new abstract database entry for the cyphertext with a handle to the participant that sent the command and pointers to the message and the key as arguments; only if a participant has handles to the cyphertext and also to the key can the participant ask for decryption. Furthermore, if the BPW model receives the same encryption command a second time, then it will generate a new (different) entry for the cyphertext. This meets the fact that secure encryption schemes are necessarily probabilistic. Entries are made known to other participants by a send command, which adds handles to the entry. The BPW model is based on a detailed model of asynchronous reactive systems introduced in [55] and is represented as a deterministic machine TH H (also an I/O automaton), called trusted host, where H = {u 1 , . . . , u m } denotes the set of all honest participants. This machine executes the commands from the user machines, in particular including the commands for cryptographic operations. A system consists of several possible structures. A structure consists of a setM of connected correct user machines and a subset S of the free ports, i.e., S is the user interface of honest users. In order to analyze the security of a structure (M, S), an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time user machine H is connected to the user interface S and a polynomial-time adversary machine A is connected to all the other ports and H. This completes a structure into a configuration of the system (see Fig. 5 ). The machine H represents all users. A configuration is a runnable system, i.e., for each security parameter k, which determines the input lengths (including the key length), one gets a welldefined probability space of runs. The BPW model maintains length functions on the entries of the abstract database; to guarantee that the system is polynomially bounded in the security parameter, there are bounds on the lengths of messages, as well as bounds on the number of signatures per key and the number of inputs per port [13] . The view of H in a run is the restriction to all inputs and outputs that H sees at the ports it connects to, together with its internal states. Formally one defines the view view con f (H) of H for a configuration conf to be a family of random variables X k where k denotes the security parameter. For a given security parameter k, X k maps runs of the configuration to a view of H.
Corresponding to the BPW model, there exists a cryptographic implementation of the BPW model and a computational system, in which honest participants also operate via handles on cryptographic objects. However, the objects are now bitstrings representing real cryptographic keys, cyphertexts, etc., acted upon by interactive polynomial-time Turing machines (instead of the symbolic machines and the trusted host). The implementation of the commands now uses provably secure cryptographic primitives according to standard cryptographic definitions (with small additions like type tagging and additional randomization). In [8, [11] [12] [13] , it was established that the cryptographic implementation of the BPW model is at least as secure as the BPW model (denoted by ≥, see Fig. 6 ), meaning that whatever an active adversary can do in the implementation can also be achieved by another adversary in the BPW model, or the underlying cryptography can be broken. More formally, a system Sys 1 being at least as secure as another system Sys 2 means that for all probabilistic polynomial-time user H, for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A 1 and for every computational structure (M 1 , S) ∈ Sys 1 , there exists a polynomial-time adversary A 2 on a corresponding symbolic structure (M 2 , S) ∈ Sys 2 such that the view of H is computationally indistinguishable in both configurations (Fig. 6) . This captures the cryptographic notion of reactive simulatability.
Not explicitly noted in [8] is that the soundness of the BPW model for symmetric encryption holds only when dishonestly generated symmetric keys cannot be injected by the adversary so that these are used by honest parties. For encryptions under these keys (e.g.,when a protocol participant uses a dishonest session key to encrypt or decrypt a message), one cannot predict/restrict what happens, as operations under dishonest keys are not covered by standard crypto assumptions. This could lead to attacks on the computational level, which do not hold on the symbolic level. A few (toy) examples of what can go wrong are presented in [32] . As a simple remedy, we make the additional assumption that every soundness result published for symmetric encryption thus far needs to make (e.g., [32] ): We assume a public-key infrastructure and certificates on symmetric keys, which allows people to distinguish bad keys from good keys (however, we refrain from modeling these certificates on the symmetric keys explicitly).
Notation Entries of the database D are tuples (ind, type, arg, hnd u 1 , . . . , hnd u m , hnd a , len). We denote by ↓ an error element available to all ranges and domains of all functions and algorithms. So, e.g., hnd a = ↓ means the adversary does not have a handle to the entry. For entries x ∈ D, the index x.ind ∈ IN DS consecutively numbers all entries in D. The set IN DS is isomorphic to N and is used to distinguish index arguments. We write
it is used as a primary key attribute of the database. The entry x.t ype ∈ t ypeset = {auth, cert, enc, nonce, list, pke, pkse, sig, ske, skse} identifies the type of x. Here, ske/pke is a private/public-key pair and skse is a symmetric key which comes with a 'public' key pkse. This "public key identifier" pkse cannot be used for any cryptographic operation but works as a pointer to skse instead (see [7] for a more detailed explanation). The entry x.arg = (a 1 , . . . , a j ) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values a i are in IN DS.x.hnd u ∈ HN DS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles by which u knows this entry. We always use a superscript "hnd" for handles. x.len ∈ N 0 denotes the "length" of the entry; it is computed by applying length functions (mentioned in Sect. 3.1). Initially, D is empty. TH H has a counter si ze ∈ IN DS for the current size of D. For the handle attributes, it has counters curr hnd u initially 0.
Kerberos in the BPW model
We now model the Kerberos protocol in the framework of [13] using the BPW model. We write ":=" for deterministic assignment, "=" for testing for equality and "←" for probabilistic assignment.
The descriptions of the symbolic systems of Kerberos 5 and PKINIT are very similar, with the difference that the user machines follow different algorithms for the two protocols. We denote Kerberos with PKINIT by "PK" and basic Kerberos by "K5." If we let Kerb ∈ {PK, K5} then, as described in Sect. for S ∈ {S 1 , . . . , S l }. Each user machine is connected to the user via ports: A port for outputs to the user and a port for inputs from the user, labeled KA_out u ! and KA_in u ?, respectively ("KA" for "Key sharing and Authentication"). The ports for the server machines are labeled similarly (see Fig. 5 ).
The algorithms that the protocol machines follow are described in Figs. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. If, for instance, a protocol machine M PK u receives a message (new_prot, PK, K , T ) at KA_in u ? then it will execute Algorithm 1A (Fig. 7) to start a new protocol run of public-key Kerberos. And if M PK u receives a message (continue_prot, PK, T, S, AK hnd ) at KA_in u ? then it will execute Algorithm 1B ( granting tickets, and the session keys for server S, respectively. This is the information a client needs to remember during a protocol run.
Only the machines of honest users u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and honest servers S ∈ {S 1 , . . . , S l } will be present in the protocol run, in addition to the machines for K and T . The others are subsumed in the adversary. We do not consider adaptive corruption of user machines. We denote by H ⊂ {1, . . . , n, K , T, S 1 , . . . , S l } the honest participants, i.e., for v ∈ H the machine M Kerb v is guaranteed to run correctly. And we assume that KAS K and TGS T are always honest, i.e., K , T ∈ H. Furthermore, given a set H of honest participants, with {K , T } ⊂ H ⊂ {1, . . . , n, K , T, S 1 , . . . , S l } the user interface of public-key Kerberos will be the set S H := {KA_out u !, KA_in u ? | u ∈ H \ {K , T }}. The symbolic system is the set Sys Kerb, symb := {(M H , S H )}. Note that, because we are working in an asynchronous system, we are replacing protocol timestamps by arbitrary messages that we assume are known to the participants generating the timestamps (e.g., nonces). All algorithms should immediately abort if a command to the BPW model yields an error, e.g., if a decryption request fails.
Initialization In order to be able to execute a protocol run, we first need to add to D the keys that are assumed to be already distributed before, i.e., long-term shared keys and public keys, together with handles for the parties that (exclusively) share those keys. For instance, we need to add to D the symmetric keys shared exclusively by K and T , S and T : k T and k S , respectively. Public-key Kerberos uses certificates; therefore, in this case, all users need to know the public key for certificate authorities and have their own public-key certificates signed by a certificate authority. For simplicity, we use only one certificate authority CA. Therefore, we add to D an entry for the public key of CA with handles for all users (i.e., to all user machines). And for every user, we add an entry for the certificate of that user signed by the certificate authority with a handle for the user (machine). Furthermore, the machines of K and u need to be able to generate signatures; therefore, we have to add signing key pairs to D with handles to the private keys for K and u, respectively, and handles to the public verification keys for all u and K . In the case of Kerberos 5, we are adding entries for the key k u shared exclusively by K and u, for all user u. All sets of nonces, tickets, and session keys that the machines of u, K , T , or S maintain are initially empty. This initialization can be formalized by calling TH H with commands to generate the longterm shared keys (gen_symenc_key(), gen_auth_key()) and public keys (gen_sig_keypair(), gen_enc_keypair()) and then requesting that corresponding handles to those keys are sent to the respective machines on secure channels. The initialization commands could be made by a (machine that represents a) trusted third party; we omit further details here.
Note that, in contrast to the analysis of Kerberos in MSR, the BPW model does not come with a type for certificates. As certificates rely on the signatures of a certificate authority with the intend of binding a users name and the user's public key, here we formalize certificates as signature by an certificate authority over a list consisting of a user's name and the user's public key. 
Algorithms
The algorithms of all machines for public-key Kerberos are given in Figs. 7, 8, 9 , 10, 11, and 12, the algorithms for Kerberos 5 in Figs. 11, 12, 13, 14 , and 15. Note that the algorithms for the machines of TGS T and a server S (i.e., Algorithms 4 and 5 in Figs. 11 and 12 ) are identical for public-key Kerberos and basic Kerberos 5.
In the following, we explain the steps of the Algorithms 1A and 2 (Figs. 7, 8 ) for M PK u and M PK K , respectively. Algorithm 1A generates the first message of PKINIT (Fig. 2) and Algorithm 2 generates the response. With these explanations the remaining algorithms should be easily understandable. For details on the definition of the used commands see [8, 12, 13] . For readability of the figures, we note on the right (in curly brackets) to which terms in the more commonly used Dolev-Yao notation the terms in the algorithms correspond (≈).
Protocol start of PKINIT In order to start a new run of PKINIT, user u inputs (new_prot, PK, K , T ) at port KA_in u ?. Upon such an input, M PK u runs Algorithm 1A (Fig. 7) which prepares and sends the AS_REQ, i.e., the first message in the AS exchange, to K using the BPW model. M PK u generates symbolic nonces in steps 1A.1 and 1A.2 by sending the command gen_nonce(). In step 1A.3, the command list(_, _) concatenates t u and n u,2 into a new list that is signed in step 1A.4 with u's private key. Because we are working in an asynchronous system, the timestamp t u is approximated by some arbitrary message (e.g., by a nonce). The command store(_) in step 1A.5-6 makes entries in the database for the names of u and T . Handles for the names u and T are returned, which are added to a list in the next step. M PK u stores information in the set N once u , which it will need later in the protocol to verify the message authentication code sent by K . In step 1A.8, N once u is updated. Finally, in step 1A.9, the AS_REQ is sent over an insecure ("i" for "insecure") channel.
Behavior of the KAS K in PKINIT Upon input (v, K , i, m hnd ) at port out K ? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the machine M PK K runs Algorithm 2 (Fig. 8) , which first checks if the message Next the machine verifies the received certificate x 1 of v by checking the signature of the certificate authority C A (steps 2.6-2.10). Then the machine extracts the public key w 2 and v's name out of the certificate (steps 2.12-16) and uses this public key to verify the signature x 2 received in the AS_REQ (steps 2.18-2.21). In steps 2.23-2.26, the types of the message components of the signed message y 1 are checked, as well as the freshness of the nonce y 12 in comparison with nonces stored in N once3 K . If the nonce is fresh, then it will be stored in the set N once3 K in step 2.28 for freshness checks in future protocol runs. Finally, in steps 2.29-2.42 M PK K generates symmetric keys k e , k a , and AK , composes the AS_REP, and sends it to v over an insecure channel.
Note: Unlike in the symbolic model, one cannot use the same key for the use in two different cryptographic primitives in the computational model, e.g., for symmetric encryption and within a message authentication code. Such scenarios are not covered by standard security definitions of cryptographic primitives and so their security guarantees may no longer hold. One needs to consider this when working with computationally sound symbolic frameworks like the BPW model. Therefore, Algorithm 2 is generating a key pair, consisting of a symmetric encryption key k e and an message authentication key k a , instead of a single symmetric key (which is denoted by k in Fig. 2 ).
Formal results
We will now prove that the fragments of Kerberos 5 discussed earlier possess the properties informally outlined in Sect. 2. We begin by formalizing the respective security properties and verify them properties in the BPW model in Sect. 4.1. Then, in Sect. 4.2, we make use of previous work to transfer the authentication aspect of these results to the computational setting, and we discuss the notion of computational secrecy.
Security in the symbolic setting
In order to use the BPW model to prove the computational security of Kerberos, we first formalize the respective security properties and verify them in the BPW model. We prove that Kerberos keeps the symmetric key, which the TGS T generated for use between user u and server S, symbolically secret from the adversary. In order to prove this, we show that Kerberos also keeps the keys generated by KAS K for the use between u and the TGS T secret. Furthermore, we prove entity authentication of the user u to a server S (and subsequently entity authentication of S to u). This form of authentication is weaker than the authentication Kerberos offers, because we do not consider the purpose of timestamps in Kerberos. Timestamps are currently not modeled in the BPW model.
Secrecy and authentication requirements
Next we define the notion of key secrecy, which was informally captured already in Property 1 of Sect. 2, as the following formal requirement in the language of the BPW model. 
where t : D denotes the contents of database D at time t. Similarly, t : p?m and t : p!m denote that message m occurs at input (respectively output) port p at time t. As above, PK refers to public-key Kerberos and K5 to basic Kerberos 5. In the next section, Theorem 1 will show that the symbolic Kerberos systems specified in Sect. 3.2 satisfy this notion of secrecy and therefore Kerberos enjoys Property 1.
Next we define the notion of authentication in Property 2 in the language of the BPW model.
Definition 2 (Authentication requirements)
ii. The authentication requirement Req Auth2 K erb is: For all u ∈ H ∩{1, . . . , n}, for all S ∈ H ∩{S 1 , . . . , S l }, and K , T :
iii. The overall authentication Req Auth K erb for the protocol Kerb is:
Theorem 1 will show that this notion of authentication is satisfied by the symbolic Kerberos system. Therefore, Kerberos has Property 2.
When proving that Kerberos has these properties, we will use the notion of a system Sys perfectly fulfilling a requirement Req, denoted Sys | perf Req. This means the property Req holds with probability 1 over the probability space of runs for a fixed security parameter (as defined in Sect. 3.1). Later we will also need the notion of a system Sys computationally fulfilling a requirement Req, denoted Sys | poly Req; this means the property holds with negligible error probability for all polynomially bounded users and adversaries (again, over the probability space of all runs for a fixed security parameter). In particular, perfect fulfillment implies computational fulfillment.
We can now capture the security of Kerberos in the BPW model in the following theorem, which says that Properties 1 and 2 hold symbolically for Kerberos. Below we will present the proof for public-key Kerberos. The proof for basic Kerberos can be found in Appendix A.2 and A.3. In order to prove Theorem 1, we first need to prove a number of auxiliary properties (previously called invariants in, e.g., [4, 10] ). Although these properties are nearly identical for Kerberos 5 and public-key Kerberos, their proofs had to be carried out separately. We consider it interesting future work to augment the BPW model with proof techniques that allow for conveniently analyzing security protocols in a more modular manner. In fact, a higher degree of modularity would simplify the proofs for each individual protocol as it could exploit the highly modular structure of Kerberos; moreover, it would also simplify the treatment of the numerous optional behaviors of this protocol.
Some of the key properties needed in the proof of Theorem 1, which formalizes Properties 1 and 2, make authentication and confidentiality statements for the first two rounds of Kerberos. These properties are described in English below for public-key Kerberos. For basic Kerberos, the corresponding properties are formalized and proved in Appendix A.
Auxiliary properties for public-key Kerberos
Next, we will consider the auxiliary properties from Sect. 4.1 for publickey Kerberos. We will again informally state the property, formalize it as a lemma in the language of the BPW model, and prove it:
Handles contained in the sets N once u and N once2 u are indeed handles of u to nonces. If K generated a symmetric key k or AK for honest v (i.e., on receiving a AS_REQ from v) and w has a handle to k or AK , then w must either be v or K. And if T generated a symmetric key SK for honest v and server S and w has a handle to SK, then w must be either v, T , or S. (Fig. 8)) D [ j] .hnd w = ↓ implies w ∈ {v, K }. Fig. 8)) D [ j] .hnd w = ↓ implies w ∈ {v, K , T }. Fig. 11 [3] ] is created in step 2.38 by applying the command sym_encrypt taking as arguments a handle to skse K ,T and a handle to the list z 3 , where z 3 .arg [1] = D[ j] .ind). By construction of Algorithm 4 ( Fig. 11) If honest user u receives what appears to u to be a valid AS_REP message, then this message (disregarding the T GT ) was indeed generated by K for u and an adversary cannot learn the contained symmetric keys. If TGS T receives a TGT and an authenticator {u, t u } AK where the key AK and the username of an honest user u are contained in the TGT, then the TGT was generated by K and the authenticator was created by u. Proof By assumption, only T and S have handles to the longterm shared key skse T S , which was used here for encryption, as stated by hypothesis (a). But since by construction of Algorithm 5 ( 
Lemma 2 (Key secrecy) For all v ∈ H, honest K , T, and S

(b) If D[ j] was created by M PK K in step 2.31, then (with the notation of Algorithm 2 (
(c) If D[ j] was created by M PK T in step 4.18, then (with the notation of Algorithm 4 in
Lemma 3 (Authentication of KAS to client and secrecy of AK ) For all u ∈ H, honest KAS K and TGS T , and for all j
Lemma 4 (TGS Authentication of the TGT) For all u ∈ H, honest KAS K and TGS T and for all j ≤ si ze with D[ j].t ype = list and j hnd := D[ j].hnd T = ↓:
l 1 := D[ j].arg[1] with D[l 1 ].t ype = symenc, {≈ T GT } l 2 := D[ j].arg[2] with D[l 2 ].t ype = symenc, {≈ {u, t u } AK } x 1 := D[l 1 ].arg[1] with D[x 1 ].t ype = pkse, {≈ k T } x 2 := D[l 1 ].arg[2] with D[x 2 ].t ype = list, {≈ AK , u, t K } x 2.1 := D[x 2 ].arg[1] with D[x 1.1 ].t ype = skse, {≈ AK } y 1 := D[l 2 ].arg[1] with D[x 1 ].t ype = pkse, {≈ AK } y 2 := D[l 2 ].arg[2] with D[y 2 ].t ype = list, {≈ u, t u } and if furthermore (a) D[x 1 + 1] = skse K T (b) D[x 2.1 − 1] = D[y 1 ] (c) D[x 2 ].arg[2] = D[l 1 := D[ j].arg[1] with D[l 1 ].t ype = symenc, {≈ ST } l 2 := D[ j].arg[2] with D[l 2 ].t ype = symenc, {≈ {u, t u } SK } p 1 := D[l 1 ].arg[1] with D[ p 1 ].t ype = pkse, {≈ k S } p 2 := D[l 1 ].arg[1] with D[ p 2 ].t ype = list, {≈ SK, u, t T } p 2.1 := D[ p 2 ].arg[1] with D[ p 2.1 ].t ype = skse, {≈ SK} r 1 := D[l 2 ].arg[1] with D[r 1 ].t ype = pkse, {≈ SK} r 2 := D[l 2 ].arg[2] with D[r 2 ].t ype = list, {≈ u, t u } and if furthermore (a) D[ p 1 + 1] = skse T S (b) D[ p 2.1 ] = D[r 1 − 1] (c) D[ p 2 ].arg[2] = D[r 2 ].arg[1] = u then D[l 1 ]
Proof of Theorem 1 for Public-key Kerberos
First we prove the Secrecy Property: Assume that there was an output (ok, PK, S, SK hnd ) at KA_out u !. Examining Algorithm 3 (Figs. 9, 10) , we see that the handle SK hnd and the server name S form an element (S, SK hnd ) of the set Session_K eysS u (see steps 3.64, 3.65) . By the definition of Session_K eysS u (see step 3.61), M PK u obtained the handle SK hnd in step 3.51 and steps 3.55 & 3.56 guarantee that SK hnd is indeed a handle to symmetric keys. By Algorithm 3 (steps 3.50-3.56), SK hnd , the name of server S and a handle to a nonce x 2.2 were obtained from a list l 2 (in the notation of Algorithm 3) to which M PK u obtained a handle in step 3.50 after decrypting d 3 with a symmetric key AK ; i.e., it is l 2 .arg [1] [2] ].t ype = pkse and Steps 5.6 and 5.7 ensure that the index of x 1 = SK really points to a symmetric key. Also, all other steps of Algorithm 5 must have been executed by M PK S without abort before the output (ok, PK, u, k hnd ). Therefore, we see that steps 5.2-5.7 and the definitions of the basic command sym_decrypt guarantee that m 5.1 from Algorithm 5 must have the same structure as l 1 from Lemma 6. Furthermore, steps 5.9-5.13 show that u's name was included in a list y to which S gets a handle in step 5.9 after decryption of m 5.2 using the key x 1 = SK. Therefore, m 5.2 from Algorithm 5 has the same structure as l 2 from Lemma 6. Since it is easy to verify that hypotheses (a), (b) and (c) are also satisfied by the corresponding indices contained in m 5.1 and m 5.2 , and since u is honest, we can use Lemma 6 to infer that an adversary cannot get a handle to the key SK. This proves the Secrecy Property.
Next we prove the Authentication Property: (i) Say there was an output (ok, PK, v, x hnd 1 ) at KA_out S ! at a time t 3 ∈ N. By construction of Algorithm 5, there must have been an input (v, S, i, m hnd ) at out S ? at a past time. In order for there not to be any abort during the execution of Algorithm 5 at some point between the input (v, S, i, m hnd ) at out S ? and the output (ok, PK, v, x hnd 1 ) at KA_out S !, we see, just as above, that m's components m 5.1 = m.arg [1] and m 5.2 = m.arg [2] [2] ] was created by M PK v in step 1B.5. The latter implies that there was an input (continue_prot PK, T, S, AK hnd ) at KA_in v ! at a past time t 2 < t 3 . On the other hand, by the definition of T GT icket u in step 3.42 and by steps 1B.1 & 1B.2, there must have been an output in step 3.43 that contained a handle to the same symmetric key as in the input to Algorithm 1B, namely the key AK . Otherwise there would be an abort in step 1B.2, i.e., there was an output (ok, KAS_exchange PK, K , T, (., ., ., AK hnd )) at KA_out v !. Since the execution of Algorithm 3 did not produce an error, one can use Lemma 3 to infer that M PK K must have run Algorithm 2 and generated AK for v. Finally, by construction of Algorithm 2 and by definition of the command verify, one gets that v must have run Algorithm 1 with the input (new_prot, PK, K , T )) at KA_in v ! at a time t 1 < t 2 .
(ii) Now say that there was on output (ok, PK, S, SK hnd ) at port KA_out u ! at time t 2 . By construction of Algorithm 3, this only happens after u received an input (S, u, i, m hnd ) at out u ? and without there being any abort during the execution of Algorithm 3 between the input and the output (steps 3.63-3.73). By steps 3.64 and 3.65, m was encrypted using a symmetric key SK (i.e., m.t ype = symenc and m.arg [2] = SK.ind − 1) for which (S, SK hnd ) ∈ Session_K eysS u . Steps 3.68-3.71 ensure that u's name was not the first argument of the list l 3 (in the notation of Algorithm 3) to which M PK u obtains a handle after decryption of m using SK (i.e., u = l 3 .arg [1] ). Here l 3 .hnd u = ↓ otherwise there would be an abort of Algorithm 3, by Convention 1. On the other hand, the element (S, SK hnd ) ∈ Session_K eysS u was added in step 3.61 after the key SK was used for encryption in step 3.59 of a list x 5 (in the notation of Algorithm 3) which does contain u's name as its first argument (i.e., u = x 5 .arg [1] [1] ].arg [1] and S = D[d 3 .arg [1] ].arg [4] ). Using Lemma 5, we see that only T , u, and S can have handles to SK. Hence, M PK S must have used the handle to the key SK for encryption at a time t 1 < t 2 . This can only happen in step 5.15 after receiving an input (v , S, i,m hnd ) at out S ? where v = u as guaranteed by step 5.9-5.13. The encryption that M PK S generated using the key SK must have been sent for others to obtain a handle for it, so there was no abort in step 5.16; therefore, there must have been an output (ok, PK, u, SK hnd ) at KA_out S ! at some time t 1 < t 2 .
This proof shares similarities with the Dolev-Yao style proofs of analogous results attained for Kerberos 5 and PKINIT using the MSR framework [21, 22, [27] [28] [29] . The two approaches are similar in the sense that both reconstruct a necessary trace backward from an end state, and in that they rely on some form of induction (based on rank/co-rank functions in MSR). An intriguing problem for future work is a formal comparison between these two Dolev-Yao encodings of a protocol and between the proof techniques they support.
Security in the cryptographic setting
The results of [13] allow us to take the authentication results in Theorem 1 and derive a corresponding authentication results for a cryptographic implementation of Kerberos. Just as Property 2 holds symbolically for Kerberos, this shows that it holds in a cryptographic implementation as well. In particular, entity authentication between a user and a server in Kerberos holds with overwhelming probability (over the probability space of runs). However, symbolic results on key secrecy can only be carried over to cryptographic implementations if the protocol satisfies certain additional conditions. Kerberos unfortunately does not fulfill these definitions, and it can easily be shown that cryptographic implementations of Kerberos do not fulfill the standard notion of cryptographic key secrecy, see below. With regard to authentication, the following does hold. For the proof of Theorem 2, we need to show that the Commitment Problem does not occur for Sys PK,id or Sys K5,id . As in [8] , let NoComm be the following property: "If there exists an input from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, then future inputs may only cause this key to be sent within an encryption that cannot be decrypted by the adversary". The Commitment Problem occurs when keys that have been used for cryptographic work while being at that time only known to honest users are revealed to the adversary later in the protocol. If the simulator in [13] (with which one can simulate a computational adversary attack on the symbolic system) learns in some abstract way that, e.g., a cyphertext was sent, the simulator generates a distinguishable cyphertext without knowing the symmetric key nor the plaintext. If the symmetric key is revealed later in the protocol then the trouble for the simulator will be to generate a suitable symmetric key that decrypts the cyphertext into the correct plaintext. This is typically an impossible task. In order for the simulation with the BPW model to work, one thus needs to check that the Commitment Problem does not occur in the protocol. Kerb,id , for Kerb ∈ {P K, K 5}, perfectly fulfills the property NoComm, i.e., Sys Kerb,id | perf NoComm.
Lemma 7 Absence of the Commitment Problem The ideal Kerberos Sys
Proof Note first that the long-term symmetric keys that are shared between KAS and TGS, TGS and server, and, in the case of basic Kerberos, between user and KAS will never be sent if the user, the TGS, and the server are honest. Therefore, we are left to verify that the Commitment Problem does not occur for the keys generated during a protocol run. In the case of public- K , respectively M PK T , since the adversary knows the keys shared between dishonest parties. Note that the message sent at the end of the execution of M PK K , respectively M PK T also contains a part that is encrypted using a handle to D [i] . However, this will not cause the simulator to encrypt with an arbitrary random key since it parses all messages completely before constructing the computational version bottom-up (as described in [8, 13] The requirements Req Auth K 5 and Req Auth P K , which are defined above, are integrity properties as defined in Definition 2 of [6] . Because of the polynomial bounds on message length and number of inputs, it is decidable in polynomial time whether a run satisfies these requirements. Thus, we may prove that Sys K5, comp | poly Req Auth K 5 and that Sys PK, comp | poly Req Auth P K by applying Theorem 1 (Conservation of Integrity Properties) of [6] to our Theorem 1 above, since these protocols do not have the "Commitment Problem."
We may thus invoke the Conservation of Integrity Properties (Theorem 1 of [6] ) to obtain Theorem 2.
Basic Kerberos: The proof is analogous.
As far as key secrecy is concerned, it can be proven that the adversary attacking the cryptographic implementation does not learn the secret key string as a whole. However, it does not necessarily rule out that an adversary will be able to distinguish the key from other fresh random keys, as required by the definition of cryptographic key secrecy. This definition of secrecy says that an adversary cannot learn any partial information about such a key and is hence considerably stronger than requiring that an adversary cannot obtain the whole key. For Kerberos, we can show that the key SK does not satisfy cryptographic key secrecy after the last round of Kerberos, i.e., SK is distinguishable from other fresh random keys. It should also be noted that this key SK is still indistinguishable from random after the second round but before the start of the third round of Kerberos. We have the following proposition Proof (a) To see that Kerberos does not offer cryptographic key secrecy for SK after the start of the third round, note that the key SK is used in the protocol for symmetric encryption. As symmetric encryption always provides partial information to an adversary if the adversary also knows the message that was encrypted. An adversary can exploit this to distinguish the key SK as follows: the adversary first completes a regular Kerberos execution between C and S learning the message {C, t } SK encrypted under the unknown key SK. The adversary will also learn a bounded time period T P (of a few seconds) in which the timestamp t was generated. Next a bit b is flipped and the adversary receives a key k, where k = SK for b = 0 and k is a fresh random key for b = 1. The adversary now attempts to decrypt {C, t } SK with k yielding a message m. If m = C, t for a timestamp t then the adversary guesses b = 1. If m = C, t for a timestamp t, then the adversary checks whether t ∈ T P or not. If t / ∈ T P then the adversary guesses b = 1, otherwise the adversary guesses b = 0. The probability of the adversary guessing correctly is then 1 − , where is the probability that for random keys k, SK the cyphertext {C, t } SK decrypted with k is C, t with t ∈ T P. Clearly, is negligible (since the length of the time period T P does not depend on the security parameter). Hence, SK is distinguishable and cryptographic key secrecy does not hold. (b) However, before the third round has been started the key SK is not only unknown to the adversary but, in particular, SK has not been used for symmetric encryption yet. We can therefore invoke the key secrecy preservation theorem of [9] , which states that a key that is symbolically secret and symbolically unused is also cryptographically secret. This allows us to conclude that SK is cryptographically secret from the adversary.
For similar reasons, we also have the next proposition Optional sub-session key Kerberos may allow the client or the server to generate a sub-session key. This optional key can then be used for the encryption of further communication between the two parties. To send the optional sub-session key to the other party, the generator of this optional key (C or S) includes the key as part of the message which is encrypted using the session key SK. For instance, server S may generate the optional key k and send {t , k} SK as the AP_REP. It is easy to see that, due to the key secrecy of SK, an adversary cannot learn the optional key (i.e., in the language of the BPW model, an adversary does not get a handle to this key). Since the optional key is not used in the protocol, we may invoke the preservation of key secrecy theorem, Theorem IV.1 of [9] . This theorem says that unused keys, which the adversary cannot learn, are kept cryptographically secret by the protocol. This approach is illustrated for the Yahalom protocol in [10] . 
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have exploited the Dolev-Yao style model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [8, 11, 12 ] to obtain the first computational proof of authentication for the core exchanges of the Kerberos protocol and its extension to public keys (PKINIT). Although the proofs sketched here are conducted symbolically, grounding the analysis on the BPW model automatically lifts the results to the computational level, assuming that all cryptography is implemented using provably secure primitives. We could establish cryptographic key secrecy (in the sense of indistinguishability of the exchanged key from a random key) only for the optional sub-key exchanged in Kerberos; for the actually exchanged key, we could not prove cryptographic key secrecy.
Concerning future work, we plan to investigate if the algorithms that are supported by PKINIT [61] satisfy the cryptographic assumptions of our proofs. For the symmetric encryption scheme, which is also used in basic Keberos, this has been done in [20] . It remains an open question whether the supported public-key encryption schemes, the digital signature schemes, and the checksum algorithms meet the cryptographic assumptions we make in this work.
Furthermore, it seems promising to augment the BPW model with specialized proof techniques that allow for conveniently performing proofs in a modular manner. Such techniques would provide a simple and elegant way to integrate the numerous optional behaviors supported by Kerberos and nearly all commercial protocols; for example, this would facilitate the analysis of DH mode in PKINIT which is part of our ongoing work. We intend to tackle the invention of such proof techniques that are specifically tailored toward the BPW model, e.g., by exploiting recent ideas from [35] . Another potential improvement is to augment the BPW model with timestamps; this would in particular allow us to establish authentication properties that go beyond entity authentication [21, 22, [27] [28] [29] [30] . An additional item on our research agenda is to fully understand the relation between the symbolic correctness proof for Kerberos 5 presented here and the corresponding results achieved in the MSR framework [21, 22, [27] [28] [29] .
sees that M K5 (ok, K5, u, k hnd ) . Therefore, we see that steps 5.2-5.7 and the definitions of the basic command sym_decrypt guarantee that m 5.1 from Algorithm 5 must have the same structure as l 1 from Lemma 13. Furthermore, steps 5.9-5.13 show that u's name was included in a list y to which S gets a handle in step 5.9 after decryption of m 5.2 using the key x 1 = SK . Therefore, m 5.2 from Algorithm 5 has the same structure as l 2 from Lemma 13. Since it is easy to verify that hypotheses (a), (b) , and (c) are also satisfied by the corresponding indices contained in m 5.1 and m 5.2 , and since u is honest, we can use Lemma 13 to infer that an adversary cannot get a handle to the key SK . This proves the Secrecy Property.
Next we prove the Authentication Property: (i) [2] ] was created by M K5 v in step 1B.5. The latter implies that there was an input (continue_prot K5, T, S, AK hnd ) at KA_in v ! at a past time t 2 < t 3 . On the other hand, by the definition of T GT icket u in step 3.19 and by steps 1B.1 and 1B.2, there must have been an output in step 3.20 that contained a handle to the same symmetric key as in the input to Algorithm 1B, namely the key AK . Otherwise there would be an abort in step 1B.2, i.e., there was an output (ok, KAS_exchange K5, K , T, (., ., ., AK hnd ) ) at KA_out v !. Since the execution of Algorithm 3 did not produce an error, one can use Lemma 10 to infer that M K5 K must have run Algorithm 2 and generated AK for v. Finally, by construction of Algorithm 2 and by definition of the command verify, one gets that v must have run Algorithm 1 with the input (new_prot, K5, K , T )) at KA_in v ! at a time t 1 < t 2 .
(ii) Now say that there was on output (ok, K5, S, SK hnd ) at port KA_out u ! at time t 2 . By construction of Algorithm 3, this only happens after u received an input (S, u, i, m hnd ) at out u ? and without there being any abort during the execution of Algorithm 3 between the input and the output (steps 3.40-3.50). By steps 3.41 and 3.42, m was encrypted using a symmetric key SK (i.e., m.t ype = symenc and m.arg [2] = SK.ind − 1) for which (S, SK hnd ) ∈ Session_K eysS u . Steps 3.45-3.48 ensure that u's name was not the first argument of the list l 3 (in the notation of Algorithm 3) to which M K5 u obtains a handle after decryption of m using SK (i.e., u = l 3 .arg [1] ). Here, l 3 .hnd u = ↓, otherwise there would be an abort of Algorithm 3 by Convention 1. On the other hand, the element (S, SK hnd ) ∈ Session_K eysS u was added in step 3.56 after the key SK was used for encryption in step 3.36 of a list x 5 (in the notation of Algorithm 3) which does contain u's name as its first argument (i.e., u = x 5 .arg [1] 3 .arg [1] ].arg [1] and S = D[d 3 .arg [1] ].arg [4] ). Therefore, only T , u, and S can have handles to SK . Hence, M K5 S must have used the handle to the key SK for encryption at a time t 1 < t 2 . This can only happen in step 5.15 after receiving an input (v , S, i,m hnd ) at out S ?, where v = u as guaranteed by step 5.9-5.13. The encryption that M K5 S generated using the key SK must have been sent for others to obtain a handle for it, so there was no abort in step 5.16; therefore, there must have been an output (ok, K5, u, SK hnd ) at KA_out S ! at some time t 1 < t 2 .
